One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other agents.
Introduction
Consider a scenario where there is a collection of m indivisible goods that are to be divided amongst n agents. For a properly chosen notion of fairness, we desire our division to be fair. Motivating examples are dividing the inherited wealth among heirs, dividing assets of a bankrupt company among creditors, divorce settlements, task assignments, etc.
Fair division has been a central problem in Economic Theory. This subject was first introduced in 1948 by Steinhaus [24] in the Polish school of mathematics. The primary model used the metaphor of cake to represent a single divisible resource that must be divided among a set of agents. Proportionality is one of the most well-studied notions defined to evaluate the fairness of a cake division protocol. An allocation of a cake to n agents is proportional, if every agent feels that his allocated share is worth at least 1/n of the entire cake. Despite many positive results regarding proportionality and other fairness notions (e.g. envy-freeness) in cake-cutting (see among many others, [5, 23, 24, 9, 3, 4] ), moving beyond the metaphor of cake the problem becomes more subtle. For example, when the resource is a set of indivisible goods, a proportional allocation is not guaranteed to exist for all instances 1 .
For allocation of indivisible goods, Budish [8] introduced a new fairness criterion, namely maximin-share, that attracted a lot of attention in recent years [1, 22, 18, 12, 25] . This notion is a relaxation of proportionality for the case of indivisible items. Assume that we ask agent i to distribute the items into n bundles, and take the bundle with the minimum value. In such a situation, agent i distributes the items in a way that maximizes the value of the minimum bundle. The maximin-share value of agent i is equal to the value of the minimum bundle in the best possible distribution. Formally, the maximin-share of agent i, denoted by MMS i , for a set M of items and n agents is defined as max
where Π is the set of all partitions of M into n bundles, and V i (P j ) is the value of bundle P j to agent i. In a nice paper, Procaccia and Wang [22] show that in some instances, no allocation can guarantee maximin-share to all the agents, but an allocation guaranteeing each agent 2/3 of his maximin-share always exists. This factor has been recently improved to 3/4 by Ghodsi et al. [12] . Our goal in this paper is to generalize the maximin-share to the case of the agents with externalities. Roughly speaking, externalities are the influences (costs or benefits) incurred by other parties. For resource allocation problems, externalities imply that the bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utility of the other agents. In this work, we assume that the externalities are positive, which is a common assumption in the literature [15, 7, 20] .
There are many reasons to consider externalities in an allocation problem. The goods to be divided might exhibit network effects. For example, the value of an XBox to an agent increases as more of his friends also own an XBox, since they can play online. Many merit goods generate positive consumption externalities. In healthcare, individuals who are vaccinated entail positive externalities to other agents around them, since they decrease the risk of contraction. Furthermore, allocating a good to an agent might indirectly affect the utility of his friends since they can borrow it.
The messages of our paper can be condensed as follows: First, considering the externalities is important: value of EMMS (the natural generalization we define to adapt MMS to the environment with externalities) and MMS might have a large gap. In fact, we show that even a small amount of influence can result in an unbounded gap between these two notions. Thus, when the externalities are not negligible, methods that guarantee MMS to all the agents might no longer be applicable. Second, regarding our model and fairness notion, we can approximately maintain fairness in the environment with externalities. In the next section, we give a more detailed description of our results and the techniques used in the paper.
Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we take one step toward understanding the impact of externalities in allocation of indivisible items. We start by proposing a general model to capture the externalities in a fair allocation problem under additive assumptions. Although we present some of our results with regard to this general model, the main focus of the paper is on a more restricted model, namely network externalities, where the influences imposed by the agents can be represented by a weighted directed graph. This model is inspired by the well-studied linear-threshold model in the context of network diffusion.
We suggest the extended-maximin-share notion (EMMS) to adapt maximin-share to the environment with externalities. Similar to maximin-share, our extension is motivated by the maximin strategy in cut-and-choose games. We discuss two aspects of our notion.
First, we discuss the hardness of computing the value of EMMS i , where EMMS i is the extendedmaximin-share of agent i. For this, we introduce a generalized form of the partition problem that includes many famous partitioning problems such as maximin, minimax, and leximin partitioning problems. This generalized problem is NP-hard due to a trivial reduction from the partition problem. In Section 4, we propose a 1/2-approximation algorithm for computing EMMS i (Theorem 4.2). In fact, we show that the LPT method, which is a famous greedy algorithm in the context of job scheduling, guarantees 1/2-approximation for the general partition problem. We also reveal several structural properties of such partitions.
Second, we consider the approximate α-EMMS allocation problem. That is, allocations that guarantee every agent a utility of at least a fraction α of his extended-maximin-share. We define the property of β-self-reliance and show that when the agents are β-self-reliant, there exists an allocation that guarantees every agent i a utility of at least β/2-EMMS i (Theorem 5.1). This is our most technically involved result. The basic idea behind our method is as follows: every agent has an expectation value which estimates the utility that he must gain through the algorithm. Initially, the expectation value of agent i is at least EMMS i /2. In every step of the algorithm, we choose an agent and allocate him a bundle with value at least as his expectation value. Regarding the bundle allocated to this agent, we decrease the expectation value of the remaining agents. Although the algorithm is simple, the analysis is rather complex and heavily exploits the structural properties of the general partitioning problem. The combination of our existential proof with the 1/2-approximation algorithm for computing EMMS yields a polynomial time β/4-EMMS allocation algorithm.
Additional Results
Brânzei et al. [7] extend the proportionality to the case of the agents with externalities. Here, we define the average-share notion and claim that average-share is a better extension of proportionality in presence of externalities. We justify our claim by considering the implications among extendedmaximin-share, average-share, and extended-proportionality.
In interest of space, most of the proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Related Work
Maximin-share has received a lot of attention over the past few years [22, 12, 1, 13, 18, 11, 25, 2, 6] . The counter-example suggested by Procaccia and Wang [22] refutes the existence of any allocation with the maximin-share guarantee. In addition, Procaccia and Wang propose the first approximation algorithm that guarantees each agent 2/3 of his maximin-share. Recently, Ghodsi et al. [12] improve the approximation ratio to 3/4. For the special case of 3 agents, Procaccia and Wang [22] prove that guaranteeing 3/4 of every agent's maximin-share is always possible. This factor is later improved to 7/8 by Amanatidis et al. [1] and to 8/9 by Gourvès and Monnot [13] . Kurokawa et al. [18] show that when the valuations are drawn at random, an allocation with maximin-share guarantee exists with a high probability, and it can be found in polynomial time.
Other works generalize maximin-share for different settings. For example, Farhadi et al. [11] generalize maximin-share for the case of asymmetric agents with different entitlements. They introduce the weighted-maximin-share (WMMS) criterion and propose an allocation algorithm with a 1/2-WMMS guarantee. Suksompong [25] considers the case that the items must be allocated to groups of agents. Gourvès and Monnot [13] extend maximin-share to the case that the goods collectively received by the agents satisfy a matroidal constraint and propose an allocation with a 1/2 maximin-share guarantee.
In recent years, considering externalities for different problems has received an increasing attention in computer science [16, 15, 7, 20, 19, 2, 21, 6, 11] . For example, Haghpanah et al. [15] study auction design in the presence of externalities. In a more related work, Brânzei et al. [7] consider externalities in the cake cutting problem. They introduce a model for cake cutting with externalities and generalize classic fairness criteria to the case with externalities. Following this work, other works also consider externalities in fair division. For example, Li et al. [20] study truthful and fair methods for allocating a divisible resource with externalities.
Model
Throughout the paper, we assume M is a set of m indivisible items that must be fairly allocated to a set N = [n] of agents, where [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We introduce our model in Section 2.1 and our fairness criteria in Section 2.2.
Modeling the Externalities.
We start by proposing a general model to represent the externalities. In the general externalities model, we suppose that for every set S of items, V j,i (S) reflects the utility that agent i recieves by allocating S to agent j. In this model, there is no restriction on the value of V j,i (.), except that the valuations are additive, i.e., V j,i (S) = b∈S V j,i ({b}).
We also consider a more restricted model where the externalities are due to the relationships between agents. For example, friends may share their items with a probability which is a function of their relationship. We consider a directed weighted graph G where for every pair of vertices i and j, the weight of edge ( − → j, i), denoted by w j,i , represents the influence of agent j on agent i. We refer such a graph as influence graph. If we allocate item b to agent j, the utility gained by agent i from this allocation would be V i ({b}) · w j,i , where V i is the valuation function of agent i. As an example, consider the influence graph illustrated in Figure 1 . For the allocation that allocates S i to agent i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6), total utility of agent 1 would be V 1 (S 1 ) · 0.8 + V 1 (S 2 ) · 0.2. We call such a model the network externalities model. Notice that, in this model, the utility of agent i for allocating a set S of items to himself is V i (S) · w i,i . In this paper, we suppose w.l.o.g. that the weights of the edges in the influence graph are normalized, so that for every agent i, j w j,i = 1. Although we prove some of our results for the general externalities model, our main focus is on the network externalities model.
For example in Figure 1 , agent 1 is 0.8-self-reliant and agent 5 is 0.55-self-reliant. In real-world situations, we expect β to be a value close to 1. Note that, being β-self-reliant for β 1 doesn't mean that we can ignore the externalities (for example, see the instance presented in the proof of Observation 5.1). Definition 2.2 For every agent a i , we define the influence vector of agent i, denoted by x i = [x i,1 , x i,2 , . . . , x i,n ] as the vector representing the influences of the agents on agent i in the influence graph, in non-decreasing order. Figure 2: The illustration of two partitions P 1 and P 2 , which are respectively a minimax and a maximin partitions.
Fairness Criteria
Proportionality and envy-freeness are two of the most common criteria in the literature of cake cutting. For envy-freeness, two extensions are introduced to deal with externalities: swap-envyfreeness by Velez [26] and swap-stability by Brânzei et al. [7] . In addition, Brânzei et al. [7] defined extended-proportionality as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Extended-proportionality [7] ) LetV i be the maximum utility that agent i can gain by allocating each item to the right agent, i.e., agent that maximizes the value of that item for agent i. Allocation A is extended-proportional, if the utility of every agent i from A is at least
In this paper, we suggest another extension of proportionality, which we call average-share. 
Furthermore, an allocation is said to be average, if the total utility of every agent from this allocation is at least as his average-share.
It is easy to observe that both of these notions are equivalent to proportionality in the absence of externalities. However, average-share is a stronger notion, i.e., for every agent i, we have V i (M) ≥ V i /n. For the network externalities model, we havê
We claim that average-share is a better extension of proportionality to capture the externalities. Note that extended-proportionality suffers from a drawback, that is its low sensitivity to the externalities. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that the best allocation of agent i is to allocate every item to himself. In such a situation, extended-proportionality completely ignores the externalities. We discuss more on this in Section 3.
It is worth to mention that both the notions described above are too strong to be delivered in the case of indivisible items. For example, when there are no externalities, no allocation can guarantee neither envy-freeness nor proportionality, or even an approximation of them. Thus, no extension of these notions (including extended-proportionality and average-share) can be guaranteed when items are indivisible.
Maximin-share
In this paper, our main focus is on the maximin-share (MMS) criterion. As mentioned, this notion is introduced by Budish [8] as a fairness criteria in division of indivisible items. In Section 1, we gave a formal definition of this notion. The intriguing fact about MMS solution is that it can be motivated by the "cut and choose" game. In this game, an agent divides the items into n bundles and lets other agents choose their bundle first. In the worst-case scenario, the least valued bundle remains, and hence the maximin strategy is to divide the items in a way that the minimum bundle is as attractive as possible. In contrast to proportionality and envy-freeness, guaranteeing a constant fraction of the maximin-share for all the agents is always possible [22, 12] .
To extend maximin-share to the case of the agents with externalities, again we consider the worst-case scenario in an "extended cut and choose" game. Suppose that an agent divides the items into n bundles, and other agents somehow distribute these bundles (one bundle to each agent). The maximin strategy of this agent is to divide the items in a way that maximizes his utility in the worst possible scenario (a scenario that minimizes his utility). In fact, we define the extended-maximin-share of each agent i as his outcome in the "extended cut and choose" game, regarding maximin strategy.
Formally, let P = P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n be a partition of M into n bundles. Furthermore, let A : P → [n] be an allocation function that allocates every set P i to agent A(P i ). For brevity, when P is clear from the context, we use A i instead of A(P i ) to refer to the agent whom P i is allocated to. Since exactly one bundle must be allocated to each agent, A is a bijection. The utility of agent i for an allocation A is :
. The worst allocation of P regarding agent i, denoted by W i (P ), is the allocation of P that minimizes the utility of agent i:
where Ω P is the set of all n! different allocations of P . Similarly, the best allocation of P is defined as: B i (P ) = arg max A∈Ω P U i (A). Finally, the extended-maximin-share of agent i, denoted by EMMS i , is defined as:
where Π is the set of all partitions of M into n subsets. We also define the optimal partition of M regarding agent i, denoted by O i , as the partition that determines the value of EMMS i , O i = arg max P ∈Π U i (W i (P )). Throughout the paper, when speaking of the network externalities model, we assume that the bundles in
). In addition, when the agent is clear from the context, for any partition P we use P j to refer to the j'th valuable bundle of P , regarding that agent.
Finally, an α-EMMS fair allocation problem with the externalities is defined as follows: is there an allocation such that every agent i receives a utility of at least α · EMMS i ?
Model Evaluation
In Section 2.1, we introduced three notions: extended-proportionality, average-share, and extendedmaximin-share. For a better understanding of these notions, here we briefly compare them in the general externalities model. We already know that average-share is stronger than extendedproportionality. In Lemma 3.1, we prove the same proposition for extended-maximin-share.
Lemma 3.1 Average-share is a stronger notion than extended-maximin-share.
By a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we can show that for an arbitrary partition P , V i (M) ≤ U i (B i (P )). Therefore, for any partition P we have EMMS i ≤ U i (B i (P )). Lemma 3.1 states that extended-maximin-share is implied by average-share. However, as we show in Lemma 3.2, there is no implication between extended-proportionality and extended-maximin-share.
Lemma 3.2 Extended-maximin-share does not imply extended-proportionality, nor vice versa.
The fact that in the case without externalities, proportionality is stronger than maximin-share (MMS), inspires the idea that average-share is a more appropriate extension of proportionality for the case with externalities. In addition, comparing two scenarios in the proof of Lemma 3.2 reveals that the extended-proportionality has a low sensitivity to the externalities.
In the last part of this section, we show that for n = 2, a simple cut and choose method guarantees EMMS i to both the agents. Note that there are instances in which neither extendedproportionality nor average-share can be guaranteed even for two agents. Lemma 3.3 For two agents, the following simple cut and choose algorithm yields a 1-EMMS allocation:
• Ask the first agent to partition the items into his optimal partition O 1 .
• Ask the second agent to allocate O 1 (one bundle to each agent).
Computing EMMS
In this section, we study the problem of computing EMMS i and O i . A closer look at the model reveals that the challenges to calculate EMMS are twofold. One is to find the worst allocation of a given partition, and the other is to find a partition that maximizes the utility of the worst allocation. In Lemma 4.1 and Observation 4.1, we explore the hardness of these problems for the general externalities model. We then focus on the network externalities model and give a constant approximation algorithm for computing EMMS.
Lemma 4.1 Given a partition P = P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n of the items in M, the worst allocation of P regarding agent i can be found in polynomial time.
Observation 4.1 Since finding the maximin partition of a set of items is N P -hard [27] , finding the optimal partition of m items and n agents with externalities is also N P -hard.
Woeginger [27] also showed that finding the maximin partition of a set of items without externalities admits a PTAS. However, their method does not directly extend to the case with externalities. To the best of our knowledge, finding an approximately optimal partition for an agent in the general externalities model has not been studied before.
In the case of network externalities, our model is easier to deal with. Since the utility of each agent is a convex combination of his valuation, finding the worst allocation W i (P ) is trivial: consider an n-step allocation algorithm whose every step allocates the most valuable remaining bundle to a currently unallocated agent with the least effect on agent i. Hence,
Recall that x i (the influence vector of agent i) is non-decreasing, and the bundles in P are sorted in non-increasing order of their values for agent i. This property of the network externalities model allows us to approximate the value of EMMS i with a constant ratio, using a simple greedy approach. On top of that, it is possible to infer relations between EMMS and some previously defined partitioning schemes. Apart from the allocation of bundles, partitioning the items is another challenge to overcome. By definition, an optimal partition is a partition that maximizes Equation (1) . Finding an optimal partition for a given vector x is in fact, a generalized form of partitioning problems that includes both maximin and minimax partitions. What happens if we partition the items by one of the famous partitioning schemes such as minimax or maximin? A maximin partition is a partition that maximizes the value of the minimum bundle. It is easy to see that a maximin partition is optimal when x = [1, 0, . . . , 0] . Likewise, minimax partition is a partition that minimizes the value of the maximum bundle, and it is the optimal partition when x = [
Another example is the leximin partition. A leximin partition first maximizes the minimum bundle, and subject to this constraint, maximizes the second least valued bundle, and so on. Real-world applications of leximin allocations are recently studied by Kurokawa, Procaccia and Shah [17] . For a small enough , the optimal partition for vector x = [
Since none of these partitioning schemes are always optimal, approximating either of them is not desirable. However, the well-known greedy algorithm LPT 2 provides a partition
LPT is a simple greedy algorithm in the context of job scheduling. This algorithm starts with n empty bundles and iteratively puts the most valuable remaining item into the bundle with the minimum total value. It is proved that the partition provided by LPT is a constant approximation for both maximin and minimax partitions [14, 10] . 
To prove Theorem 4.2, we label some of the items as huge. Huge items are those whose values are at least V i (M). Denote the set of huge items for agent i by H i .
Claim 4.1 For an instance with no huge items we have
Hence, when there is no huge item, regarding Claim 4.1, Inequality (2) holds. Thus, to prove Theorem 4.2, it only suffices to consider the instances with huge items. Note that, when there are huge items in M, V i (L i,n ) ≥ V i (M)/2 does not necessarily hold. To cope with such a situation, we need to consider some properties for O i .
Definition 4.3
We call a partition P nice for agent i, if no item b in some bundle P j exists, such that
Claim 4.2 For any partition P , there exists a nice partition P , such that U i (W i (P )) ≤ U i (W i (P )).
In the rest of this paper, we focus on the optimal partitions which are nice. Furthermore, it can be easily observed that L i is also nice. 2 
Longest processing time
In a nice partition P regarding agent i, any bundle P j containing a huge item b ∈ H i has no other item. Otherwise, Proof of Theorem 4.2. We use induction on the number of agents. For n = 1, the statement is trivial.
Thus, when M contains no huge item, by Claim 4.1, L i is a 1/2-approximation of O i . Therefore, it only remains to consider the case that n > 1 and V i (L i,n ) < V i (M)/2. For this case, we know that M contains at least one huge item.
Let B H i (O i ) and B H i (L i ) be the set of the bundles containing huge items in O i and L i respectively. We know that 
Let W i (O i ) be the worst possible allocation of O i with the constraint that allocates |H i | huge items to the |H i | agents with the least influence on agent i. By definition,
, huge items are allocated to the same set of agents, say N H i . Now, consider the sub-instance with items M \ B H i (O i ) and agents N \ N H i . Note that since
By the induction hypothesis, for this sub-instance, Inequality (2) holds. Now, adding huge items and their corresponding agents back, increases the utility of agent i by the same amount for both of the allocations. Thus,
α-EMMS Allocation Problem
In this section, we focus on the allocations that guarantee every agent i an approximation of EMMS i . We start this section by comparing EMMS i and MMS i . Note that the value of MMS is determined by the least valued bundle in the maximin partition, while
where Q i is a maximin partition of agent i. In addition, U i (W i (Q i )) is a convex combination of the values of several bundles with a value of at least MMS i , and hence EMMS i ≥ MMS i always holds. Furthermore, Observation 5.1 states that the gap between EMMS i and MMS i could be unbounded even for the instances with 3 agents. It is worth to mention that the proof of Observation 5.1 highlights that even for very few externalities, the gap between EMMS and MMS might be large. Thus, the external effects are not negligible even if the impacts of the parties on each other are small.
Our main result is stated in Theorem 5.1. We show that for the network externalities model when all the agents are α-self-reliant, an α/2-EMMS allocation always exists.
Theorem 5.1 Let C be an instance where for every agent i, w i,i ≥ α. Then, C admits an α/2-EMMS allocation.
In the rest of this section, we prove Theorem 5.1 by proposing an α/2-EMMS allocation algorithm for the network externalities model with α-self-reliant agents. For brevity, we name our algorithm Bundle Claiming algorithm (BC).
Bundle Claiming Algorithm (BC)
In this section, we present the ideas and a general description of Bundle Claiming algorithm. First, let us review the definition of EMMS i . With abuse of notations, we suppose that v i is a vector representing the values of the bundles in the optimal partition of agent i, i.e., v i,j = V i (O i,j ). Recall that the bundles in O i are sorted by their decreasing values for agent i. Hence, for all j < n, we have v i,j ≥ v i,j+1 . Furthermore, by definition, we have EMMS i = j x i,j v i,j . In the beginning of the algorithm, the expectation level of all the agents are set to 1. Our algorithm consists of n steps. In each step, we find a bundle B with the minimum number of items that meets the expectation of at least one agent. Bundle B meets the expectation of agent i, if
We allocate B to one of the agents whose expectation is met (we say this agent is satisfied). Next, we update the expectation levels of the remaining agents. The updating process is a fairly complex process which we precisely describe in Section 5.2. Roughly speaking, we update the expectation levels in a way that the following property holds during the algorithm:
External-satisfaction property: Let S be the set of currently satisfied agents. For every remaining agent i with expectation level i , there is a partition of the agents in S into i subsets, namely N i,1 , N i,2 , . . . , N i, i −1 , N i,F , such that for all 1 ≤ j < i , the total set of items allocated to the agents in N i,j is worth at least v i,j /2 and at most v i,j to agent i, and the total set of items allocated to the agents in N i,F is worth less than v i, i /2 to agent i.
Note that in the updating process, i may increase by more than one unit. However, for every remaining agent i, i ≤ n must also hold. As we show in Section 5.2, during our algorithm, i ≤ n always holds for every agent i. We use the lower-bounds in this property to show that if the external-satisfaction property holds for agent i, total amount of externalities incurred by the satisfied agents is at least k< i v i,k x i,k /2. The fact that EMMS i is calculated with regard to the worst allocation of O i is the key to prove this inequality.
Consider one step of the algorithm and suppose that a set B of items is allocated to agent i. Since B met the expectation of agent i, V i (B) ≥ v i, i /2. Furthermore, the utility that agent i gained through the externalities of the satisfied agents is at least k< i v i,k x i,k /2. Assuming that agent i is α-self-reliant, his utility is at least
ALGORITHM 1: Bundle Claiming algorithm 1 forall the a j ∈ N do 2 j ← 1 Initializing expectation levels
Allocate the minimum sized Γ i to agent i. Allocating
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Remove agent i from N , and Γ i from M.
Maintaining external-satisfaction (see Section 5.2)
Inequality (3) ensures that the items allocated to agent i satisfy him. Furthermore, we use the upper bounds in the external-satisfaction property to prove that the algorithm satisfies all the agents. To show this, it only suffices to prove that in each step of the algorithm there are enough items to meet the expectation of the remaining agents. Consider agent i which has not satisfied yet. The value of the items allocated to the satisfied agents not in N i,F is at most
Hence, the total value of the remaining items plus the items allocated to the agents in N i,F is at least j≥ i v i,j . On the other hand, the value of the items allocated to the agents in N i,F is less than v i, i /2. Thus, the value of the remaining items is at least v i, i /2 which is enough to meet the expectation of agent i. As said before, our algorithm maintains the property that i ≤ n for every remaining agent i.
The details of the bundle claiming algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithm 1, which is a high level abstraction of the full algorithm and captures the overall sketch of the algorithm. In the next section, we show how to maintain the external-satisfaction property in the algorithm.
We end this section by showing that BC can be implemented in polynomial time. The only part of the algorithm whose implementation in polynomial time is not trivial is when we want to find a minimum-sized set B meeting the expectation of at least one agent.
Observation 5.3
The minimum-sized set that meets the expectation of at least one remaining agent can be found in polynomial time.
It is worth to mention that the operations we apply in order to maintain the external-satisfaction property in the next section, are also trivially polynomial time.
Finally, using L i 3 instead of O i in BC results in an α/4-EMMS allocation algorithm.
Corollary 5.3 Let C be an instance where for every agent i, w i,i ≥ α. Then, an α/4-EMMS allocation for C can be found in polynomial time.
Maintaining the External-satisfaction Property
Throughout this section, we suppose that S is the set of satisfied agents. Furthermore, for each agent i in S, we denote the bundle allocated to him by B i . We start by giving a detailed explanation 3 Partitioning provided by LPT algorithm of the updating process. As mentioned in the previous section, the external-satisfaction condition must hold during the entire algorithm. To maintain this property in the updating process, for every agent i, we define a mapping M i that represents the partitioning of S for agent i (recall the definition of external-satisfaction).
Definition 5.4
For every agent i, we define M i : S → {O i,1 , O i,2 , . . . , O i,n } ∪ {F i } as a mapping that corresponds each satisfied agent to a bundle in the optimal partition of O i or to F i . Furthermore, we define N i,j as the set of agents that are mapped to O i,j in M i and N i,F as the set of agents mapped to F i . During the algorithm, we say mapping M i is valid, if the following conditions hold:
During the algorithm, mapping M i must remain valid for every unsatisfied agent i. In the beginning, S = ∅ and for every agent i, i = 1 and hence, M i is valid. In every step of the algorithm, we satisfy an agent i by a bundle B i of items. Next, for every unsatisfied agent j, we map agent i to F j in M j , i.e., we set M j (i) = F j . In fact, N j,F corresponds to the satisfied agents that are not mapped to any bundle of O j in M j . We use these agents to update j . Throughout the algorithm, whenever the total value of the items allocated to the agents in N j,F reaches v j, j /2, M j becomes invalid and hence, we need to update j and M j to reinstate the validity of M j . To do so, we pick a subset δ of the agents in N j,F with the minimum size to map them to O j, j . Regarding the validity conditions of M j , total value of the items allocated to the agents in δ must be at least v j, j /2 and at most v j, j (we call such subset a compatible set). If a compatible set δ exists, we map the agents in δ to O j, j in M j and increase j by one. However, there may be some cases that no subset of N j,F is compatible. For such cases, we use the argument in Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.5 Suppose that total value of the items allocated to the agents in N j,F is at least v j, j /2, but N j,F admits no compatible subset. Then, it is possible to modify M j such that conditions (i) and (ii) remain valid for M j and N j,F contains at least one compatible subset.
Note that, after increasing j for agent j, condition (iii) may still be violated. In that case, as long as condition (iii) is violated, we continue updating. Each time we update M j , value of j is increased by one. Since at least one agent is mapped to O j, for each < j , j never exceeds n. In the appendix, you can find a pseudo-code for the updating process (Algorithm 2)
In the last part of this section, we prove Lemma 5.6 which shows that the value of the externalities imposed to agent i by the satisfied agents is lower-bounded by j< i x i,j v i,j /2. As said before, the fact that EMMS i is defined with regard to the worst allocation of O i plays a key role in proving Lemma 5.6. Lemma 5.6 Consider one step of the algorithm, and let agent i be an arbitrary remaining agent
A Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Consider O i and let A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n }, where A k is an allocation of O i that allocates O i,j to agent j = ((j + k − 1) mod n) + 1. Since in A each item is allocated to each agent once, j U i (A j ) = j V j,i (M). Thus, the worst allocation in set A has a utility of at most
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Consider an instance with one item b and n agents, and the following two scenarios for the externalities:
In scenario (i), EMMS 1 = 0, while the extended-proportional share of agent 1 is V 1,1 ({b})/n. In the second scenario, EMMS 1 = V 1,1 ({b}), but the extended-proportional share of agent 1 is still
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We know U 2 (B 2 (O 1 )) ≥ EMMS 2 . Furthermore, since W 1 (O 1 ) determines the value of EMMS 1 , we have:
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Consider a complete bipartite graph G(X, Y ) where X represents the bundles of P , and Y represents the agents and there is an edge with weight V j,i (P k ) between every pair x k ∈ X and y j ∈ Y . Finding W i (P ) is equivalent to finding the maximum cardinality matching with minimum weight in G. Classic network flow algorithms solve this problem in polynomial time [? ] .
Proof of Claim 4.1. Consider L i,1 (the most valuable bundle of L i for agent i). Trivially, we have V i (L i,1 ) ≥ V i (M), and since there is no huge item, L i,1 contains at least two items. On the other hand, according to LPT, the items within a bundle arrive in non-increasing order. Therefore, the last item added to L i,1 has a value of at most V i (L i,1 )/2 and the total value of L i,1 just before the last item arrives must have been at least V i (L i,1 )/2. Furthermore, whenever an item is added to a bundle, that bundle has the minimum value among all the bundles. Therefore,
Proof of Claim 4.2. Since P is not nice, there exists an item b in bundle P j , such that V i (P j ) > V i ({b}) > V i (P n ). We modify P as follows: we remove P j and P n from P and add two new bundles A = {b} and B = P j ∪P n \{b} to P . Let l and l be the indices of the newly added bundles in P (note that the bundles are rearranged by their decreasing values for agent i), such that j ≤ l ≤ l ≤ n (see Figure 3) . We have
By this modification, U i (W i (P )) increases by a value of at least
which is non-negative since
After each modification, either V i (P n ) increases, or |L(P )| decreases. Therefore, sequence (V i (P n ), V i (P n−1 ), . . . , V i (P 1 )) increases lexicographically Proof of Observation 5.1. Simply consider the influence graph depicted in Figure 4 and three items b 1 , b 2 and b 3 such that V 1 ({b 1 }) = 1 and V 1 ({b 2 }) = V 1 ({b 3 }) = c/ , where is a small constant less than 1/2. For this instance, EMMS 1 = (1 − 2 ) + 2c, and MMS 1 = 1 − 2 which means
Proof of Observation 5.3. For every remaining agent i, we find a bundle Γ i with the minimum size which meets the expectation of agent i as follows: sort the remaining items in their decreasing values for agent i, and add the items to Γ i one by one until the bundle meets the expectation of agent i. Finally, it only suffices to select the smallest bundle among these bundles.
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Let δ be a subset of N j,F with the minimum size that satisfies condition (i). Such a set trivially exists. Since no subset of N j,F is compatible, we have k∈δ V j (B k ) > v j, j . By minimality of δ, no proper subset of δ satisfies condition (i). It is easy to observe that this can only happen when δ contains only one agent, say k, with V i (B k ) > v j, j . We show in Lemma A.1 that |B k | = 1; but for now suppose that b is the only item in B k .
Since O j is nice 4 , there is an index < j , such that bundle O j, = {b}. We modify M j as follows: we map agent k to O j, and map the former agents of N j, to F j . Clearly, conditions (i) and (ii) preserve for M j after this process. Again, if no subset of N j,F is compatible, we repeat this modification. Each time we modify M j , the number of indices for which O j, is mapped to an agent j with O j, = B j increases by one. Therefore, the process terminates after a finite number of modifications.
Algorithm 2 illustrates an overview of the update procedure, which completes the BC algorithm. 4 Recall the niceness from Definition 4.3
Let be an index s.t. O j, = B k , where δ = {k}.
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Swap δ (which is a subset of N j,F ) with N j, .
One step closer to resolve Lemma A.1 Suppose that the total value of the items allocated to the agents in N j,F is at least v j, j /2, but N j,F admits no compatible subset, and let δ be the minimal subset of N j,F that satisfies condition (i). Then, δ contains only one agent, say agent k and |B k | = 1.
Proof. As mentioned in Lemma 5.5, it is easy to observe that |δ| = 1. Here, we argue that if agent k is the only agent in δ, then |B k | = 1. As a contradiction, let z 1 be the first step of the algorithm that δ = {k}, but |B k | > 1. In addition, let z 2 be the step that B k was allocated to agent k and let j be the expectation level of agent j in step z 2 . Trivially, we have z 2 ≤ z 1 .
Proof of Claim A.1. If for some ≤ j , O j, contains more than one item, O j, has a proper subset s such that V j (s) ≤ v j, /2. By the same reasoning as Claim 4.2, moving s to bundle O j,n yields a new partition which is at least as good as O j (See Figure 3) . Hence, we can assume w.l.o.g. that v j,n ≥ v j, j /2 holds.
Regarding Claim A.1, we consider two cases.
First, assume that |O j, | = 1 for all ≤ j . For this case, at least one of the items in ≤ j O j, is not allocated to any agent before step z 2 , and this item singly meets the expectation of agent j. This contradicts the fact that at step z 2 , B k was the minimal set (Note that we supposed |B k | > 1).
Second, assume that v j, j ≥ v j, j /2. In step z 2 , the expectation value of agent j equals v j, /2. Furthermore, V j (B k ) > v j, j which means V j (B k ) > v j, j /2. On the other hand, V j (B k ) < v j, j , otherwise a proper subset of B k would meet the expectation of agent j in step z 2 . Therefore, in step z 2 , δ = {k} is the only compatible set for updating M j and hence, agent k is mapped to O j, j . This also implies that z 2 = z 1 , since we supposed that no compatible subset exists in step z 1 .
Furthermore, notice that since |B k | > 1, no item could singly meet the expectation of any agent, including agent j in step z 2 . This means that every remaining item in step z 2 has the value less than v j, j /2. On the other hand, in all the modifications before step z 1 , the bundle allocated to the agent in δ consists of only one item (z 1 is te first step that the size of the bundle allocated to the agent in δ is more than 1). This means that after step z 2 , no modification affects the agents that are mapped to bundles O j, for ≤ j . But this contradicts the fact that agent k is mapped to F j in step z 1 , because agent k is mapped to O j, j and no modification changes M j (k).
Proof of Lemma 5.6. We want to show that in every step of the algorithm, for each remaining agent i, Inequality 4 holds.
To prove this, we apply a sequence of exchanges between the bundles allocated to the agents in j< i N i,j and show that in every exchange, value of the expression on the left-hand side of Inequality (4) does not increase 5 . Next, we show that after these exchanges, Inequality (4) holds, which means that the Inequality was held for the original allocation.
Let agent j be the agent in N i,1 with the least influence on agent i (i.e., minimizes w j,i ). First, we allocate the bundles that belong to the other agents in N i,1 to agent j and remove all the agents but agent j from N i,1 . Since agent j has the minimum weight among the agent in N i,1 , this operation does not increase the left-hand side of Inequality (4).
In addition, let agent j be the agent with w j ,i = x i,1 . Since agent j has the minimum weight among all the agents, w j ,i ≤ w j,i . Now, let B j and B j be the current bundles of agents j and j . Note that if j is not satisfied yet, B j = ∅. If V i (B j ) < V i (B j ), we swap the bundles of j and j . This operation also does not increase the left-hand side of Inequality (4) since we have w j ,i ≤ w j,i . Finally, we exchange the set that agents j and j belong to: we remove agent j from N i,1 , and add agent j to N i,1 . In addition, if agent j previously belonged to N i,r for some r, we add agent j to N i,r . This exchange has no effect on the value of j∈S w j,i · V i (B j ). Furthermore, one can easily observe that after the exchange, condition (ii) holds.
We repeat the same procedure for N i,2 , N i,3 , . . . , N i, i −1 . After this sequence of exchanges, each N i,j contains one agent j , where w j ,i = x i,j . Furthermore, after the exchanges, the second condition for the validity of M i holds and hence, the value of the items of agent j for agent i is at least v i,j /2. Therefore, total amount of externalities of the satisfied agents is at least j< i x i,j v i,j /2.
5 Note that these exchanges are only to prove this lemma, and not in the algorithm.
